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ABSTRACT 
Wireless sensor networks are becoming significantly vital to many applications, and they were initially 
used by the military for surveillance purposes. One of the biggest concerns of WSNs is that they are very 
defenceless to security threats. Due to the fact that these networks are susceptible to hackers; it is 
possible for one to enter and render a network. For example, such networks may be hacked into in the 
military, using the system to attack friendly forces.  
Leap protocol offers many security benefits to WSNs. However, with much research it became apparent 
that LEAP only employs one base station and always assumes that it is trustworthy.  It does not consist of 
defence against hacked or compromised base stations. In this paper, intensive research was undertaken 
on LEAP protocols, finding out its security drawbacks and limitations. A solution has been proposed in 
order to overcome the security issues faced in implementing this protocol whilst employing more than one 
base station. The performance of the proposed solution has been evaluated and simulated to provide a 
better network performance. 
KEYWORDS 
Network Protocols, Wireless Sensor Network (WSN), LEAP protocol, Security, compromised nodes 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Wireless technology has propagated the use of sensor networks in many applications. Sensor 
networks join small sized sensors and actuators with general purpose computing components 
[1]. Such networks comprise of hundreds and sometimes thousands of self-functioning, low 
power, inexpensive wireless nodes to observe and influence the surroundings.  
 
Figure 1.  Example of a Wireless Sensor Network 
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Wireless sensor networks usually consist of a single or multiple base stations acting as points of 
centralized control, whereby they provide access to other networks.  These networks are unique 
in their dynamic network topologies. A network topology is usually selected depending on the 
type of application the sensors are used for or where it is situated. The types of topologies used 
for sensor networks include star, mesh, star-mesh etc. [2]  
In Wireless sensor networks there are two kinds of wireless nodes; sensor and base station 
nodes. The main function of the base station (also referred to as sinks) relies on managing the 
actions executed to provide reliable and efficient sensing support. It provides a gateway to other 
networks or acts as a data storage processing data in a powerful way [3]. It even acts as an 
access point to human interface for human interaction, and is capable of broadcasting control 
data in the network or removes data from it. The base station node will calculate and send the 
even source, its position and a timestamp to the analysis centre. If an alert is received by the 
base station regarding a target, an identity of the target will be allocated allowing all related 
alerts getting appropriate management.  
Every sensor within the network primarily consists of a certain amount of power and a base 
station that provides entrance to other networks or to the centre analysis. It is important to know 
that base stations have significant features over other nodes in the network. They comprise of 
adequate battery power to exceed the existence time of all sensor nodes, and have the capacity 
to save cryptographic keys, well-built processors and resources to commune with external 
networks. 
In contrast to the base stations, in a sensor network a large number of sensor nodes are 
connected together with radio frequency communication links, giving much significance to 
broadcasting in the network [1]. Protocol procedure plays a vital role. Although they have 
concerns with trust assumptions, energy usage is decreased when using these protocols. The 
main purpose of these nodes is to gather information or events occurring from their targets. The 
main functions associated with sensor nodes include: collecting information on the target with 
consideration to their nature and positioning, which involves the communication from nodes to 
base stations regarding for example sensor readings and particular alerts. 
Nodes should be capable of producing real-time events on detected targets using the base station 
node to forward an even transmission to a centre for the event to be analyzed [4]. Base stations 
may request updates from sensor nodes, resulting in base station to node communication.  
Finally the generated events will be relayed to the base station from the sensor nodes.  In this 
part of the communication architecture, base stations contact all of the nodes it is assigned for 
purposes such as routing beacons or reprogramming of the complete network. 
Given that sensor networks usually compose of nodes that are not physically protected in certain 
environments, these networks contain further vulnerabilities to security threats. Some of these 
security threats include passive information gathering, Sink-hole attacks, Wormhole attacks, 
false node and malicious data and so forth.  
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Figure 2.
In the attempt to conquer all of these factors which affect the designs of Wireless sensor 
networks, we have to trade off performance or expenses so that these liabilities are decreased to 
tolerable levels.  Due to the fact that such factors are motivated by cost and application l
performance and energy, to minimize their affects, it is preferable sometimes to acquire sensor 
hardware that is more efficient in terms of security and consist of more than one base station. 
This, of course, is more expensive than sensors having a si
protocols, software or certain services, sometimes there is a need for trading of performance or 
cost for security.  
This paper proposes a solution to some of the security issues faced in WSNs. 
paper focuses on LEAP protocol taking into consideration its advantages and 
overcome its disadvantages.  
 
2. LEAP PROTOCOL 
LEAP is also a very popular security solution in Wireless Sensor Networks and it was proposed 
by Zhu et al in 2004. The Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol (LEAP) is a key 
management protocol used to provide security and support to sensor networks. It uses µTESLA 
to provide Base station broadcast authentication and a one
packets [5]. This protocol is inspired by the idea that every message broadcasted between 
sensor-nodes is different from another and comprise of different security requirements. In order 
to meet the variety of security requirements when exchanging messages, ha
mechanism is impractical, thus LEAP proposes four types of keys assigned to every individual 
node. The four types of keys established are: individual keys, pair
group keys [6]. 
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2.1 Individual Key 
The Individual key is a unique key shared between a node and its corresponding base station in 
order to provide security between them as they commune. Communication between a node and 
a base station is vital as it allows a node to inform the base station of any abnormal behavior 
detected from its surrounding nodes. As a result, the base station being aware of the malicious 
node can then use the key to encrypt the important information such as instructions to a specific 
node.   The individual key can be fabricated using the following equation:  
   	
  
Where  is the pseudo random function,  is the initial key, also known as the master key and 
	 is the ID of node u 
2.2 Pair-wise Key 
The pair-wise key is a key shared between a node and its neighbouring sensor nodes. The 
establishment of this key ensures protection of communication that longs for privacy or 
authentication of a source. The advantage of having a pair-wise key secures transmission 
because it is shared between a node and one of its immediate neighbors and therefore prevents it 
from intruders. After the individual key has been set up, nodes can then identify their neighbors 
by sending out a message with its ID waiting for a response from the neighbor node n. The Pair-
wise (Kp) key can be fabricated by the following equation:  
   	
 
u → * : 	, Nonceu 
n → u : IDn, MACKn(Nonceu|IDn) 
Thus,  
   	
 
2.3 Group Key 
A group key, also known as the global key is shared by all the sensor nodes within the network. 
The base station uses this key to encrypt data that is transmitted to all the nodes within the 
group. Since the entire group of nodes is sharing this key, it eliminates the need for a base 
station to separately encrypt the same message to individual nodes with individual keys. 
Confidentiality is invoked as long as the key is updated every once a while in case one of the 
nodes stops functioning and is removed from the group or network.   A special case of a group 
key is known as the cluster key.  
2.4 Cluster Key 
The cluster key is a key shared by a node with multiple of its neighboring sensor nodes. The 
cluster key is generated by node u using a random function and encrypts this key using the pair-
wise key so that only the authenticated neighbors are able to decrypt to get access to the cluster 
key. Hence, Kc (cluster key) is generated randomly by node  
u → ni : ()  
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The advantages of this protocol are simply that it reduces the participation of a base station and 
it is efficient in terms of communication and energy. Its security purposes mainly cover local 
communication such as routing information and protecting messages sent from the nodes. The 
establishment of this key allows nodes to decrypt and authenticate certain messages like 
readings from neighboring nodes. Therefore, LEAP permits the use of cluster keys which one 
node may use to protect its data allowing only authenticated neighboring nodes to obtain and 
decrypt this data.  
All in all, it can be stated that LEAP protocols are very advantageous in that they offer 
mechanisms for authenticating both: broadcasting of a base station and source packets, as well 
as mechanisms providing key revocation and refreshing. Other advantages LEAP presents a 
network are its scalability and cluster communication abilities.  
However, the major disadvantage of this protocol, which can influence the network most, is that 
it only consists of a single base station and assumes that it is never compromised [7].  Other 
drawbacks include security weakness that is present during the process of key establishment, 
and the high cost of capacity needed to store the four different keys for each node, when the 
number of nodes is small.    
In the leap protocol, several efforts are made through the use of the keying mechanisms to 
ensure that a compromised node is revoked or at least prevent it from slowing the network 
operations. On the other hand, the LEAP protocol lacks in preventing attacks on the base station 
itself, which happens to be very critical as the base station covers a large network operational 
area.  
3. PROPOSED SOLUTION: IMPROVED LEAP PROTOCOL 
In literature, the majority of the key management protocols usually focus on the aspect that only 
a singular base station or sink node is used in a WSN and these protocols assume that it is 
trustworthy. For some systems, however, several sink nodes are used [8]. In these systems, two 
important things must be considered: cost and security.  
In the leap protocol, several efforts are made through the use of the keying mechanisms to 
ensure that a compromised node is revoked or at least prevent it from slowing the network 
operations. A base station, on the other hand, will be treated the same as any compromised node 
and the idea is to apply the same mechanisms used to overcome a compromised node to also 
prevent a hacked base station node.  
With a lot of excessive research, the literature usually covers WSN functionalities in terms of 
one base station participating in one system. It is important to remember that with an increase in 
a sensor network there’s an increase in the distance separating the base station and its related 
sensor nodes and the increase in the distance may alter the following: 
- With a long distance for packets to propagate through, they may get lost on the way 
resulting in network performance degradation.   
- Data transmissions between sensor nodes and a single base station in a large network 
require high energy consumptions giving the need to reduce the lifetime of nodes. 
- For the nodes that are situated nearby a base station, their energy is worn out rapidly, 
which in turn shortens the network life time very drastically.    
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To overcome these problems, a network employing several base stations shows potential in 
bettering the performance. However, there is of course the tradeoff between performance and 
cost.  By deploying more than one sink node in a network may be costly, but the distance 
between the sink nodes and its associated sensor nodes will be reduced providing more 
successful paths for data transmission as well as eliminating the disadvantage of the high energy 
consumptions otherwise faced.  
For this research, a WSN with several base stations will be considered. Under the circumstances 
that a base station and a sensor node are compromised, an evaluation of the network 
performance will be analyzed.  
Wireless sensor networks provide the advantage of using a large number of nodes (from a 
hundred up to thousands of nodes) communicating with each other inexpensively. One or more 
base stations process all of the network functions. Should there be a need to increase the number 
of sink nodes, one has to consider enhancement in expenses. The LEAP protocol offers much 
security to a system with the establishment of the four keys, mentioned previously. The protocol 
consists of key revocation and refreshing mechanisms in the attempts to successfully avoid or 
deal with compromised sensor nodes.  
The methods used in detecting the isolated compromised nodes are done through µTESLA and 
one-way key chain hash authentication functions [9]. However, this protocol lacks in security 
against a base station, should it be compromised, and network robustness. These are significant 
aspects to consider because if a sink node is compromised, it could severely affect the entire 
network or system as all the network functions are dealt by these nodes. The flexibility feature 
of a LEAP protocol is advantageous over many other security protocols used, but improvements 
in robustness are needed. Therefore, to improve the LEAP protocol, a solution is proposed to 
overcome the limitations faced for possible attacks on the base stations itself and thereby adding 
more robustness to the network system in terms of recovering from a compromised base station 
as well as a compromised sensor node.   
In theory, the majority of research papers, consider the presumption of a reliable base station 
and only take measures for compromised nodes. In isolated locations, it is relevant to be vigilant 
in case a base station is compromised. Security against higher levels of attacks against a base 
station, which usually occur from sources with higher computational power, is a necessity [10]. 
In a wireless sensor network, three courses of actions can occur: 
- A sensor node is compromised 
- A base station is compromised 
- Sensor nodes and base stations are compromised concurrently 
The LEAP protocol only consists of actions that deal with the first scenario. In improving the 
LEAP protocol, all three scenarios have to be dealt with, thus a network has to be built with 
more than one base station. So, by ensuring that the LEAP protocol is able to handle all three 
scenarios aforementioned, the LEAP protocol will be improved in terms of security for WSNs.   
I used the same mechanisms as the original LEAP protocol to overcome compromised sensor 
nodes, and added another similar mechanism to detect if any of the base stations are to be 
compromised. For this solution, I had to establish another key, called the Base station key (Kb). 
The base station key will also be updated periodically, and it is shared amongst the base 
stations. If a base station is hacked, it will not be aware of the updated session key, and continue 
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to use its old key. In doing so, the base station will not be involved in the data transmission, and 
the other remaining base stations will identify that this base station is compromised. 
The authenticated base stations will send the administrator a message indicating that one of the 
base stations is hacked. It is then up to the administrator to remove it from the system or replace 
it with another one. However, there is always a case whereby the opponent base station will act 
like an authenticated node and accuse one of the other validated base stations of being hacked. 
The administrator will consider any of the base stations to be hacked if at least more than one of 
the remaining three base stations declares otherwise. 
4. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
To evaluate the proposed solution, an algorithm has been developed to simulate a sensor 
network using the MATLAB program. The whole idea was to implement a system whereby 
multiple base stations have been employed for the soul purposes of improving the data 
transmissions amongst nodes and to come up with a solution for a base station, should it be 
compromised.  
The LEAP protocol was implemented and simulated using one base station and fifty sensor 
nodes situated randomly. Initially, an individual key was generated for each node from a 
randomly generated master key. Then a cluster key was generated by each node and published 
to their neighboring nodes using the pair-wise keys. Finally, the global key was generated in 
order to enable public broadcasts.  
Figure 3 shows an ideal case for the LEAP protocol. It simply represents a base station 
surrounded by fifty sensor nodes. In this scenario, none of the nodes are compromised. 
However, even though it is an ideal case, we still face the problem of data loss. For arguments 
sake, let’s assume that node z wants to communicate with the base station. Having a singular 
base station means that no matter how far the distance, the sensor node and the base station will 
commune with each other. The longer the distance, however, the more nodes they have to 
transmit through, the more bandwidth will be used and the higher the possibility of loss of data.  
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Figure 3. LEAP protocol: Ideal scenario 
Figure 4 shows the scenario of a compromised node.  The node that is labelled symbolizes a 
node that has been hacked. As mentioned throughout this paper, the LEAP protocol is very 
efficient when it comes to dealing with compromised nodes. With its key refreshing and 
revocation schemes, if a node is affected, these mechanisms prove advantageous. With the many 
keys assigned to all the sensor nodes with its periodic updates, if one of the nodes is unable to 
decrypt an updated key, the compromised node will not be able to further participate in the data 
transmission which will then inform the surrounding nodes and eventually the base station that 
this node is no longer wanted. The compromised node will be removed.  
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Figure 4. LEAP protocol: A compromised Sensor Node 
 
In order to simulate and test the performance of the proposed improved LEAP protocol, a WSN 
of hundred sensor nodes situated randomly, and four base stations also situated randomly has 
been generated.  
Figure 5 shows the improved LEAP protocol in an ideal scenario, whereby multiple base 
stations are supported. Depending on the distance between the nodes and the base stations, each 
sensor node was assigned to its closest base station. The four different colors (red, blue, green 
and black) are used in order to distinguish between the base stations and its corresponding 
sensor nodes.  
This diagram illustrates an ideal scenario whereby none of the nodes or the base stations are 
compromised. The use of four base stations provides an advantage over the existing LEAP 
protocol. The idea that more than one base station has been used, the nodes will not need to 
transmit to a base station that is extremely distant from it, which means that it minimizes the 
problem most networks sometimes face regarding lost data during transmission.  
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Figure 5. Improved LEAP protocol: Ideal Scenario 
 
Figure 6 demonstrates the scenario whereby a base station is compromised. A hacked base 
station can be detected and revoked by the other base stations using the new generated key 
known as base station key (Kb). If a base station is hacked, it will not be aware of the updated 
session key, which is also updated periodically, and continue to use its old key. In doing so, the 
base station will not be involved in the data transmission, and the other remaining base stations 
will identify that this base station is compromised. The authenticated base stations will send the 
administrator a message indicating that one of the base stations is hacked. It is then up to the 
administrator to remove it from the system or replace it with another one. However, there is 
always a case whereby the opponent base station will act like an authenticated node and accuse 
one of the other validated base stations of being hacked. The administrator will consider any of 
the base stations to be hacked if at least more than one of the remaining three base stations 
declares otherwise.  
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Figure 6. Improved LEAP protocol: A compromised base station 
In this solution, the LEAP protocol was improved in terms of using multiple base stations for 
the purpose of minimizing loss of data transmissions, and also the proposed solution was able to 
detect a compromised base station. In using multiple base stations, the performance of the 
system is improved but the cost of implementation is increased.   Table 1 shows a comparison 
between the LEAP and the improved LEAP protocols.  
 
Table 1. Comparison between LEAP and Improved LEAP protocols 
 LEAP Improved LEAP 
Detects and removes Compromised Sensor 
Nodes 
Yes Yes  
Detects and removes compromised base 
stations  
No Yes 
Data Loss High Minimal 
Cost Low High 
Bandwidth use High  Low 
Transmission Delay time High Low 
Energy consumption  High Low 
Node lifetime Low High 
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